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Abstract 
This  study investigates the determinants of audit fees in commercial banks in Nigeria.  Data were collected from a 
sample of banks mostly quoted on Nigerian Stock Exchange.  Consistent with previous studies, the result of our data 
analysis showed that bank size,  degree of bank complexity and transaction and saving accounts to total deposit ratio 
are positively related and statistically significant to audit fees charged by the auditors.  Even though , non performing 
loan  is positively related to audit fees , it is statistically insignificant.  While, the risk weighted capital adequacy 
ratio is negatively related and statistically insignificant to audit fees. 
Keywords:  Audit fees, commercial banks, firm size, subsidiaries, auditor. 
 1. Introduction: 
The commercial banking sector is very vital to the operation of Nigerian economy, because of  roles it performs.  
The sector acts as depository institution and lends to various businesses, individual and various level of government.  
The banking sector equity capitalization make up of over 40 percent of Nigerian Stock Exchange (NSE) total equity 
capitalization as end of 2009, according to (NSE)  report for that year.  In addition to these, commercial banks in 
Nigeria have in their employment a significant numbers of Nigeria, thereby assisting in ameliorating the high chronic 
unemployment situation in Nigeria. 
  
Notwithstanding these important roles being played by banks, not only in Nigeria but globally accounting 
researchers have done little world wide to investigate the various relationships that exist between the banks and their 
auditors especially regarding the factors that influences pricing of audit engagement. 
Knowledge of determinants of audit fees should be of interest and importance to suppliers and users of the audit 
services as well as the regulators,  because, this would assist the auditors to examine their cost structure, predicting 
future fees and measure audit efficiency  Firth  (1997). 
 
The code of corporate governance issued by the Central Bank of Nigeria( CBN) states that  auditors of banks, which 
engage in cover up would be blacklisted by the CBN for a time period to be determined by the apex bank.  This 
would not augur well for the reputation of such accounting firm.  It is because of this that Fields et al.,  
(2004) suggested that it is in the interest of many different parties that bank auditors should emphasis factors that are 
important to regulators.  Unlike, industrial companies, the litigations risk associated with bank audits in U.S. 
stemmed from action brought by both shareholders and the Federal Government.  For example in November of 1992 
Ernest and Young was asked to pay US government a sum of $400 million to settle claims related to thrift failures. 
 
The liquidator of Barrings Bank, KPMG blamed the former auditors, Coopers and Lybrands and Delotte and Touche 
for negligence in their professional work. 
This study would contribute to knowledge because, it would add to scanty works on determinants of audits fees in 
the banking sector globally and would also give an insight to pricing of audit in financial industry from developing 
nation perspective because previous studies used data from United State of America (Stein, et al., 1994 :Field, et al., 
2004,and Kevin Swanson, 2008). 
This study would proceeds as follows, section two,  reviews literature, section three, reveals methodology of the 
study, section four, discusses results of data analysis and in section five, concluding remarks are made 
 
2 Literature Review 
Companies and Allied Matters Acts (CAMA) 2004 provides guidelines for appointment, remuneration, rights, 
functions,  powers,  terminations of auditors appointment and the establishments of audit committee for all 
companies registered in Nigeria. 
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The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and the Nigerian Stock Exchange  regulate financial reporting and 
disclosures by Nigerian quoted companies.  The  financial statements must be filed quarterly in prescribed form and 
within certain period by listed companies to SEC and NSE.  Audited financial statements must be filed with the SEC 
and NSE, and Corporate Affairs Commission and be approved by the Stock Exchange before the publication in  the 
newspaper within three months after year – end. 
 
The Central Bank of Nigeria is the apex bank and the main statutory regulator of banks in Nigeria under Banks and 
Other Financial Institutions Act (BOFIAS 1991) as amended to date.   In addition to provisions of CAMA 1990, 
money depository institutions in Nigeria are required by BOFIAS to submit audited financial statements to the 
Central Bank of Nigeria for approval before publication in a national daily newspaper within four month after the 
year end.  The governor of the Central Bank may order a special examination of a bank’s books and affairs for any 
variety of reasons. Auditors of banks have a legal duty to report certain matters including contraventions of 
legislation to the CBN. 
 
Central Bank of Nigeria conduct prudential examination on banks which include income audit, verification of capital, 
special investigations to check the authenticity of statutory reports and returns to the CBN. 
On March 1st, 2006 CBN also issued code of corporate governance for banks in Nigeria after consolidation which 
among other provides for the following. 
 
(a) External auditors should maintain arms-length relationship with the banks they audit. 
(b) Appointment of external auditors will continue to be approved by the CBN 
(c) The tenure of the auditors in a given bank shall be for a maximum period of ten years after which the audit 
firms shall not be reappointed in the bank until after a period of another ten years. 
(d) A bank’s external auditors should not provide non audit service (NAS) to their clients. 
(e) Quality assurance auditor can be engaged whenever the CBN suspects a cover-up by auditors and where 
proved, erring firms could be blacklisted from being auditors of banks and other financial institutions for a 
length of time to be determined by the CBN. 
 
There are numerous research works on audit pricing, however, most of the studies exclude financial firms due to 
differences in their financial structure, the environment which they operate and special audit requirement.  Their 
exist a well developed literature, which can be broadly be classified into two, although, there are others which may 
not fit into these  categorization,  big eight, big six and big four   audit firms  premium  and the impact of Non-Audit 
Service (NAS) provision on audit fees   Beattie, et al.(1996). 
   
According to Beattie and Fearnley (1995), there are three interrelated motives for demand for quality differentiated 
audits which are agency demand, information demand and insurance demand. While, Simunic and Stein (1987)  posit 
that supply of quality-differential audits can be as a result of product differentiation and that greater expertise implies 
greater credibility and audit quality. According to  Naser, et al.(2007), because of their visibility  large sized 
companies are expected to be more scrutinized and monitored by the public. Consequently, in order to  minimize 
agency cost and get the confidence of investors and creditors these companies usually hire big audit firms.  Studies 
by (Simunic, 1980: Palmrose, 1986: Beatty, 1993) revealed that the big audit firms charge-higher fees than other 
auditors, which have been interpreted to support the auditor size quality hypothesis. McMeeking, et al. (2006) posits 
that the Big Audit firm premium can be traced to large firms devoting resources to develop industry expertise that 
makes them better auditors in the industries in question.  They further suggested that fees premium may also arise 
from knowledge spillovers as a result of providing consulting services to their clients. 
 
There have been in tensed debate about the effects of provision of non audit service by public accounting firms for 
clients that they also serve as independent auditors.  Some are concerned that the provision of NAS by audit firms 
could be a threat to auditor independence because, NAS creates economic incentives for the auditors to preserve the 
auditor – client relationship (Simunic, 1984 and Beck, et al.1988).  An opposing viewpoint is that the provision of 
NAS by auditor create knowledge spillovers that make auditors to provide consulting services at a lower cost 
Palmrose (1986).  
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The first study on audit fee and banking institution is by Stein, et al .(1994) who investigated the determinants of 
audit pricing  for 108 financial services companies in the U. S., the outcome of their study suggest that audit fee for 
financial institutions are related to size and operational and reporting complexity as defined by the auditor as well as 
to the auditors assessment of the client internal control system. 
 
Fields, et al.(2004) study is the first research that investigated the pricing of audit services in the financial institutions 
using 277 banking organizations as sample.  The bank audit fees model developed by them is based on the 
assumption that because managers of banks and thrift ultimately are answerable to their primary regulatory 
authorities it seems reasonable to suggest that the audit function should be driven by variables and ratios that these 
regulators consider important Fields, et al.(2004) proxies for bank risks and complexity are based primarily on the 
models of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) and the Federal Reserve System (FRS).  The model is 
structured around financial ratios that measure the capital adequacy of the bank as well as its earning, liquidity and 
loan quality.  Consequently, their audit fees model are based on the following dimension of bank risks: liquidity , 
operating, capital or solvency  and market risks. 
They reported that banks with more transactions accounts, fewer securities as a percentage of total assets, higher 
efficiency, and higher degrees of credit risk are charged higher fees by the auditors.  In addition to these, Fields, et al. 
(2004) also suggested that institutions with higher risk adjusted capital ratios and more intangible assets were also 
expected to pay higher premium and concluded that no single audit firm truly dominates the US banking industry. 
 
Swanson (2008) sought to establish the link between the characteristic of a corporation and the audit fees.  Using 
data of 37 largest financial service institution for 2006 accounting year audited by the big four largest public 
accounting firms in US he reported that log of asset and log of sales relevance are both statistically significant at the 
5 percent level in determining the variation in audit fee chargeable by these firms.  However, log of net income and 
log of employee are not significant variables in determining the audit fee. 
 
2.1 The Determinants of Audit Fees 
Client Size.  The most consistent explanatory variable for audit fees model has been auditee size, see (Francis and 
Simon, 1987; Simon, et  al. 1992: lyer and lyer, 1996; Joshi and Al , 2000: Naser, et al. 2007) for non financial 
corporations and (Fields, et al. 2004 and Swanson, 2008) for financial corporations.  The  reason for this is that 
auditors in large-sized companies have to spend a lot of time and effort in reviewing their clients operations because 
audit service provided by  external auditors are sampling-based processes  therefore, as the size of the client  
increases the higher the population for which the total assets and revenue are composed, and sample size required to 
achieve a given level of control will increase at decrease rate.  Most studies use assets or sales as proxy for client size.  
In addition to this they also employ the use of logarithm because of the assumption of non linearity between audit fee 
and assets or revenue. 
  
Audit risk. Is the possibility of legal action from investor , due to auditor negligence and, consequently, the possible 
loss of income from  litigation.  This may be due to failure of the auditee’s business or non detection of material error 
in the account.  Hence, higher risk audit service would result in increase in fee charge by the auditor so as to mitigate 
against such risk.   Because banking institution is different, the audit risk peculiar to it is not the same with other 
industrial organization.  The broad group of risks faced by bank are capital, credit  and liquidity risks. 
  
Capital Risk. Capital regulation continues to play a major role in the oversight of banks and mandates that banks 
hold minimum amount of capital as cushions against unexpected losses or adverse shocks that could lead to bank 
failure.  There are many factors that influence banks choice of capital level and capital management which may be 
classified as firm-specifics factors and behaviours; regulatory environment, market discipline and economic 
conditions and procyclical capital requirement Francis and Osborne (2009).  In Nigeria the CBN requires 
commercial banks to: (a) hold the minimum level of the regulatory capital of N25 billion and (b)  
maintain a ratio of total regulatory capital to the risk-weighted asset at or a above the minimum of 10%.  Total 
qualifying capital consists of tier 1 and 2 capital less investment in unconsolidated subsidiaries and associates.  The 
total risk weighted assets reflects only credit and counter party risk. Fields, et al. (2004) posit that relationship 
between audit fees and capital risk ratio can be positive or negative.  Positive relationship between audit fee and 
capital risk ratio would prevail with riskier banks because regulators require them to maintain larger regulatory 
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capital to mitigate against the risk.  However, negative relationship between audit fees and capital risk ratio is 
expected when a bank has a lower level of risk adjusted capital ratio. 
 
Credit Risk. Credit risk can be classified into two direct credit risk and indirect credit risk.  Direct risk is the 
probability of financial loss that the bank may suffer when a borrower is unable to repay a loan on the agreed terms. 
While indirect (or counter-agent) credit risk arises when the bank, having guaranteed contractual obligations of  
client suffers financial loss when the client is unable to perform his  obligation and his commitment to the banks.  
Our measure of bank credit risk  is loan quality and it is ratio of non performing loan to gross loan and advances.  We 
expect auditors to spend significant time and effort in order for them to evaluate and be sure that the bank has not 
contravene the provisions of prudential guidelines and circular relating to details of insider related credits disclosure.  
Consequently, we expect auditors to charge higher fees where there is high ratio of nonperforming loans to cover for 
the time and effort expanded and mitigate against the risk of misstatement of audit opinion. 
 
Liquidity Risk. It is the risk that bank is unable to meet its payment obligations associated with its financial 
liabilities when they fall due and to replace funds when they are withdrawn.  The result may be the failure to meet 
obligations to repay depositors and fulfill commitments to lend.  Large numbers of demand and saving deposit 
accounts make operation of banks to be complex and leads to higher cost of operation in form of branch networks 
and associated cost of human and material resources.  Banks with higher proportion of current and savings deposits 
account have lower liquidity risk however, have greater operational complexity.  Consequently they may pay lower 
or higher audit fees Field, et al. (2004) 
   
Complexity.  Business with diversified operations such as subsidiaries, branches and foreign operations are more 
complex; therefore, audit work is also difficult.  This is because according to  Sandra and Patrick (1996) group of 
companies with many subsidiaries branches is associated with extra work in examining a greater number of 
subordinate financial statements to ensure the accuracy of the consolidated financial statements.  When 
subsidiaries/branches are in another countries they have to comply with reporting requirements in the countries 
where they operate therefore, variation in financial reporting requirements among countries would results in 
differences in the levels of materiality between subsidiaries/branches and the parent company Chan et al (1993).  
Reports from many studies suggest that complexity in terms of scope of operation or in respect of balance sheets 
composition has a significant impact on the level of the audit fee.  However, Firth (1985) reported in his study that 
number of subsidiaries and the scope of operations were statistically  insignificant to variation in audit fees charged 
by the auditors. 
  
3.0 Methodology 
3.1 Sample 
The sample of this study consists of  thirteen commercial banks which  were in operation in year 2009.  These banks 
is made of twelve which are quoted on Nigerian Stock Exchange and one international bank and it is not listed on 
Nigerian Stock Exchange.  These banks hold about eighty percent of total commercial bank asset of as 2009 
according to Central Bank of Nigeria report. 
We employee bank specific data which was extracted from various annual reports or these banks.  These annual 
reports were sourced from library of Nigeria Stock Exchange.  The period covered by our data is for only 2009. 
 
3.1.2 Model 
Ordinary least squares (OLS) was used to find the relationship between the dependent variable and the independent 
variables using the equation below. 
Logfee   =  bo + log b1asset +log b2cap +log b3  cusav +log b4 nonper+ log  b5 sub  + e 
where: 
bo      =    Constant (intercept) 
Fee     =    Audit fees (N000) 
Asset     =    Total asset (N000) 
Cap     =    Risk – weighted capital adequacy ratio 
Cursor    =    Current saving deposits account balance divided by total deposit 
Non per  =   Percentage of nonperforming loan to gross loan. 
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Sub      =   Number of subsidiaries. 
e      =  Error term. 
 
4.0 Results and Discussion 
4.1 Descriptive Analysis 
Table 1 shows descriptive statistics for the variables in the model.  The mean audit fee for banks in our sample is 
about N126.166 million, ranging from a minimum of N43million to a maximum of N200 million.  This variation is a 
reflection of the size and complexity of the audited banks.  There is a big difference among Nigeria banks with 
respect to asset owned by them.  The minimum total assets value is N129609 billion while the maximum value is 
N2009914 billion.  The mean weighted capital adequacy ratio is 23%,  minimum is 5% while maximum is 44% this 
implies that not all the sampled bank  met  the Central Bank of Nigeria requirement of 10% capital adequacy ratio . 
Current and saving deposit over total deposit ratio the  median is 0.56 while the mean is 0.34. For number of 
subsidiaries the table reveals that some banks does not have subsidiaries while, the maximum number of subsidiaries 
owned  is  seventeen.  The percentage of nonperforming loans ranges from 6% to 74% with mean of 22% this 
indicates that some of the banks are having in their loan asset portfolio significant troubled assets. 
 
4.2 Correlation Analysis 
Table 2 shows the relation of each of the variables to others in the model.  There is positive correlation between 
assets and numbers of subsidiaries.  Whereas there is a negative correlation between non performing loan asset, 
current and saving deposit account and number of subsidiaries. 
   
4.3 Multivariate Analysis 
Table 3 reports coefficient estimates of variables in  the audit fees model.  The results indicate R2 and adjusted R2 are 
0.89 and 0.80 respectively with high and significant F – statistics values this suggests that the model represent a fair 
prediction of audit fees in banking industry in Nigeria.  The result of R2 is consistent with the work of Fields et al., 
(2004) which reported R square of 0.877 and even other studies on non financial institution for example (Kent 2006) 
reported R – square of 0.803.  Consistent with prior studies (Field et al 2004 and Swanson 2008) audit fees have 
positive and significant relationship with size which is measured in this study by log of total asset.  Also, the variable 
subsidiary which is proxy of complexity is also positive as expected and statistically significant, this is in line with 
the works of (Joshi and Bastaki 2000: Thinggaard and Kiertzner 2008) . The variable  current and savings deposits 
accounts divided by total deposits  is positively related to audit fees and  statically  significant at 10%, this is 
consistent with the study of (Field et al. 2004) which reported  that banks with more transaction accounts  pay higher 
audit fees. The variable nonperforming loan has positive relationship with audit fees as expected however, it is 
statistically insignificant  while  risk weighted capital adequacy ratio is negatively related to audit fees and 
statistically insignificant in this study, these are inconsistent with study of Field et al (2004) The reasons for these 
may be as a  result of a  small sample and data that we employed in this study. 
 
5. Conclusion 
This study investigates the determinants of audit fees among sampled commercial banks in Nigeria.  The result of 
our investigation revealed that the five independent variables employed  contributed to  about 89% in variation of 
audit fees.  Furthermore, seize as measured by total asset , subsidiary a proxy for complexity and currents and 
savings deposits accounts divided by total deposit ratio are positive and all are statistically significant to audit fees 
variation .Although ,non performing loan loss is positively related to audit fees chargeable by auditors however it is 
statistically  insignificant. While,  capital adequacy ratio is negatively related to audit fee is also statistically  
insignificant 
 
The results of our study suggest that auditors of commercial banks in Nigeria based their audit fee  on the amount of 
work they undertake based on the size , complexity   and  value of transaction and saving deposit accounts of the 
banks they audit . Therefore, it seems not much consideration was given to other risks area associated with bank, 
such as, level of weighed capital  adequacy ratio and level of nonperforming loans  owned by these banks.  The 
effect of this  was probably reflected in the outcome of the Central Bank of Nigeria special audit where it was 
discovered  most of the banks risk assets are not properly value. This latter resulted in massive  write down of these 
risk assets and attendant injection of huge funds ( bailout) by Central Bank of Nigeria in order to avert distress in the 
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banking industry in 2009. Consequently, we recommend that auditors   should plan and execute their audit  
programms to take care of these observed lapses revealed by this study. 
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Table1    Descriptive Analysis  
 
Table2    Correlation Analysis 
 
  Table 3 Multivariate Analysis    
  
 FEES ASSET CAPITAL CURSAV NONPER SUB 
Mean 127.9231 875848.9 0.231538 0.514615 0.220769 8.153846
Median 127.0000 710326.0 0.240000 0.540000 0.190000 10.00000
Maximum 200.0000 2009914. 0.440000 0.670000 0.740000 17.00000
Minimum 43.00000 129609.0 0.050000 0.350000 0.060000 0.000000
Std. Dev. 48.29503 587657.2 0.108616 0.099550 0.185762 5.336137
Skewness -0.115176 0.540894 -0.080648 -0.194464 1.791669 -0.212213
Kurtosis 2.091776 2.198701 2.623917 1.867001 5.741610 2.019613
Jarque-Bera 0.475547 0.981688 0.090705 0.777266 11.02657 0.618202
Probability 0.788381 0.612110 0.955661 0.677983 0.004033 0.734106
Sum 1663.000 11386036 3.010000 6.690000 2.870000 106.0000
Sum Sq. Dev. 27988.92 4.14E+12 0.141569 0.118923 0.414092 341.6923
Observations 13 13 13 13 13 13
 FEES ASSET CAPITAL CURSAV NONPER SUB 
FEES 1 0.807 -0.136 -0.024 -0.309 0.817 
ASSET 0.807 1 -0.234 -0.085 -0.284 0.674 
CAPITAL -0.136 -0.234 1 -0.131 0.246 0.087 
CURSAV -0.024 -0.085 -0.131 1 -0.115 0.100 
NONPER -0.309 -0.284 0.246 -0.115 1 -0.211 
SUB 0.817 0.674 -0.087 0.100 -0.211 1 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
C 27.57529 32.27548 0.854373 0.4257 
ASSET 7.41E-05 1.43E-05 5.182385 0.0020 
CAP -9.591391 131.8727 -0.072732 0.9444 
CURSAV 1.371483 0.637826 2.150245 0.0751 
NONPER 42.16525 36.08705 1.168432 0.2870 
SUB 3.806572 1.434316 2.653929 0.0378 
R-squared 0.892738 Mean dependent var 126.1667 
Adjusted R-squared 0.803353 S.D. dependent var 50.00697 
S.E. of regression 22.17557 Akaike info criterion 9.342712 
Sum squared resid 2950.534 Schwarz criterion 9.585165 
Log likelihood -50.05627 Hannan-Quinn criter. 9.252947 
F-statistic 9.987533 Durbin-Watson stat 2.355727 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.007143    
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